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Internet Voting has been debated for years. Since the invention of 
blockchain, the feature of immutability makes the absolute security of 
internet voting possible. Ethereum provide a platform based on the 
blockchain for decentralized applications such as voting system. In this 
paper we will discuss about the problems of current internet voting and will 












 We have witnessed so many voting methods in our history, from holding up hands in an 
assembly in the ancient Greek era to paper ballots and electronic voting machines. The location 
of voting, however, is mostly unchanged. Most of us either vote in Polling station or use mail-in 
ballots. We have to register for each voting, and then we have to go to, if choose to vote in 
person, the designated polling station on designated vote day, to spend much more time than vote 
itself before voting. Without a doubt, the cost of voting is preventing people from exercising 
their right to vote.  Chapter 1 of this thesis will focus on the history and the present of the voting 
method and voting system and conclude their drawbacks. 
  Since the invention of the internet, going to polling stations to vote seems archaic. 
Governments are trying to implement a voting system that does not require people to physically 
present at the designated voting station. Estonia was among the first countries to adopt an 
internet-based voting system in the Estonian parliamentary election in 2007, and today there are 
more than 10 countries implementing voting over the internet. While the new platform for voting 
evidently increases the voting turnout of those countries because of the reduced cost of votes, 
there are reasonable security concerns for the platform.   
 Firstly, the internet is vulnerable to anonymous attacks from anywhere in the world. Unlike 
tempering a physical voting machine in the polling system will leave some tracks, attacking the 
internet-based voting system will hardly leave a clue to find the attacker. Other types of 
interference for the internet-based voting system include spoofing and DDoS(distributed denial-
of-service attack), which are defined as incoming traffic flooding to the server from different 
sources, making it harder for the regular visitors to enter the website. There are also viral attacks 
on the computers of voters, which theoretically can act on anything on the computer, including 
helping to vote. Moreover, there are many potential ways to temper the server or modify the 
turnout, and hackers can do those without being noticed. Moreover, because the website used for 
voting is too large extent a centralized, tempering it would have a much larger impact than the 
current distributed polling station.  Chapter 2 will access the current internet voting system and 
its potential risks to be attacked. 
A blockchain is an immutable ledger maintained using consensus as a decentralized peer-to-
peer network. It was originally proposed by Stuart Haber and W. Scott Stornetta in 1991 that 
aims to design a system where the data is timestamped to be unchanged. Later, Bayer, Haber, 
and Stornetta integrated Merkle trees into the system, which allows relevant timestamps to be 
printed in one block. It is Satoshi Nakamoto who truly realized the concept in 2008 in his famous 
Bitcoin Whitepaper. Bitcoin is a peer-to-peer electronic cash system, where the transaction does 
not go through a trusted third party. To avoid the double-spending problem, meaning you may 
use the same token twice without a trusted third party verifying, the bitcoin network used a hash 
function to encrypt every transaction with a timestamp and integrated them "into an ongoing 
chain of hash-based proof-of-work" (Satoshi,2018)a predetermined consensus rule for the 
system, forming a record cannot easily to be changed unless redoing the proof-of-work, which is 
extremely hard to achieve. Chapter 3 will introduce the underlying encryption techniques for 
blockchain and how it would be the safest under different situations. 
 The irreversibility of blockchain coincides with our demand for an online voting system. If 
voting results cannot be modified, the reliability of such a system would be the best than any 
other voting system we ever had in human history. Moreover, Voters with permission in this 
system can remain anonymous in the digital voting entirely, whereas, in traditional voting, you 
will always interact with people at the polling station and may leave a record. In addition, the 
result is fully transparent and verifiable to the authorized people depending on the specific design 
of the voting system. Last but not least, the processing time and the cost for voting would be 
minimal compared to the huge budget the government invests in voting.  
We can further improve the blockchain-based voting system by introducing smart contracts in 
our system. The smart contract is another important feature added on the blockchain which the 
term was coined by Nick Szabo in 1997. Initially used for computation purposes on the 
blockchain, the concept was developed by Vitalik Buterin in his blockchain-based platform 
Ethereum. Using the platform and its own programming language Solidity, a voting contract 
could be built before the vote, and authorized people could perform a vote-tally using its self-
tally feature. Chapter 3 will also discuss the feasibility of an Ethereum platform voting and an 
example of a simple voting contract using solidity. 
  Blockchain-based voting, though it seems extremely safe and autonomous, will have fatal 
problems if not designed properly. The consensus, for example, "proof-of-work" is based on the 
simple majority consensus of participants. However, if a single or a group of entities controls 
more than 50% of the computing power, they can do double-spending——which, in our case, 
double voting. This is an extremely rare situation but can be addressed properly by changing 
consensus rules at the time of designing the system or, as a last resort, hard fork, which 
essentially paste the blockchain right before the unauthorized. 
Similarly, smart contracts have potential problems. Not only can we write contracts on the 
blockchain to cast voting, but also, we could write contracts for buying votes. Unfortunately, 
using smart contracts, criminals can ensure the vote to be assigned their desired candidate, and 
only by doing so will the criminals give the money to the voter. Unlike in traditional voting, in 
which those buyers can never ensure their desired voting, using smart contracts can ensure it 
unless the voter does not want the money. This can be prevented by encrypting the choice of vote 
using a method that only the administrator (in the smart contract, we can always assign an 
administrator) to decrypt. By doing that, those vote buyers would never know, like in traditional 
voting, whom they vote for. In the discussion section of chapter 3, we will discuss the potential 
















Chapter 1 The history and the present of Voting system 
In the field of political philosophy, it is debatable whether the act of voting is worthy for voters 
themselves as a means to exercise democracy. The most famous theory, "paradox of voting" by 
Downs in 1957, states that it is surprising that every vote, even if they change the election results 
a little and given that it cost so much time to get to the ballot station and vote. For example, 
according to the United States Election Project in 2018, the total ballot in the 2016 presidential 
election was over 13.8 million, which means one vote only counts for less than ten million of the 
result. As a contrast, the time spent on voting, from a survey conducted in 2016 during the 
presidential election by MIT Election Lab, was on average eight minutes. It seems, according to 
Downs' theory, that the cost of voting cannot produce the maximum output. There are typical 
responses to the paradox of voting; for example, voting is merely changing the "mandate" of the 
candidate. However, to address the paradox fully, the only effective way is to reduce the cost of 
voting. If voting is merely a click on the cellphone that spends only less than a second, the 
paradox will be implausible. It is apparent that an electronic(internet) voting system can reduce 
the cost of voting substantially; thus, it is imperative to adopt it to solve the paradox of voting. 
Policymakers are aware that improving vote efficiency is crucial for motivating voters. 
Conventional electronic voting, which only involves electronic machines either in the stage of 
voting or vote-tally phrase in the poll station, is dated to 1889 when the lever machines were 
used in an election by Jacob Myers in Lockport, New York (Arnold,1999). According to 
Anandaraj and Sakthivel (2015), The voters will enter the machine and pull the lever, and will be 
locked in the machine to cast a vote. A selection is made, the lever will be pulled up, which will 
increase the appropriate counters for candidates. Such a machine was predominant by 1930 in 
almost every large city in the United States (Lelia,2003). The drawbacks of the lever machine 
applied in voting are obvious: It has a more complex voting procedure, from the opinion of 
Anandaraj and Sakthivel. However, it also reduces the overall time for the entire voting 
procedure, including the voting-tally phrase. Because the lever machine is a large machine, 
Anandaraj and Sakthivel also suggest that it is expensive to test and maintain. 
There is another widely adopted electronic voting system called the punched card and is still 
used in the present day. Voters punched holes opposite their candidate in their card, which is 
provided by the ballot station. It evolved to be the automatic machine by IBM in Mid-1960, and 
the updated one is still used in 2 counties in Idaho in the 2014 General Election 
(VerifiedVoting,2019). It has several advantages over the lever machine, including less 
maintenance, is required, and easy to store. (Selker,2004) 
It is worth pointing out that those voting machines or mechanisms are reducing the overall 
voting time, including vote and vote-tally phrase, by focusing on reducing vote-tally phrase. 
They virtually increase the cost of voting for voters themselves. As a result, we can expect that 
those two kinds of voting machines cannot motivate people by simply reducing the time for the 
voter-tally stage. 
 It is the computers applied in voting that reduce the time of voters. Direct-recording Electronic 
(DRE)voting system is still used in every election in most of the states. Most of  DRE system 
used in the United States is accompanied by a Voter-Verified Paper Audit Trail (VVPAT) which 
allows voters to "verify that the choices indicated on the paper record correspond to the choices 
that the voter has made in casting the ballot"(National Academy of Sciences, 2005). Voters can 
see a ballot display on the monitor of the machine and select whomever candidate they want to 
elect. The drawback of a machine without VVPAT is that it is not auditable, and its built-in code 
may have potential bugs that lead to malfunctioning. For example, in October 2019, During 
Governor Election in Mississippi, the voter Ethan Peterson was trying to vote for Bill Waller 
Jerome as the next Governor of Mississippi, but the DRE voting machine in Lafayette County 
repeatedly selected Tate Reeves instead (Newsy,2019). Moreover, the DRE is vulnerable to be 
hacked. Researchers from Argonne National Laboratory in Illinois Claim that it only costs $26 to 
hack an ordinary voting machine that is widely used in the U.S.Meanwhile, A DRE with an audit 
trail seems to cost more than the traditional paper ballot because it involves an audit procedure. 
The voting methods and machines mentioned above do not satisfy either of minimizing the 
cost of time for voters or the cost of vote-tally phrase. The lever machine has a complicated 
voting procedure and costs much to maintain. As for punched cards, it increases the overall vote 
time for voters. Moreover, DRE seems convenient, but it may be hacked or cause the error as we 
see many examples in reality. A DRE with an audit trail may be secure, but again, it costs much 
more in the audit procedure than that of a traditional paper ballot. 
So, is there a voting system that substantially reduces the cost of voting, meanwhile, increases 
the efficiency of the voting-tally procedure, as well as committing to the sincere choice of those 
votes? Some might say a sophisticated internet voting system would save us. 
 
 
Chapter 2 Evaluation of current Internet-based voting system 
   It is imaginable that once an Internet-based voting system is implemented, the voter turnout 
would skyrocket, for it does not require voters to stop by a polling station to exercise their 
power. However, political scientists and computer scientists will not give up the security of 
voting results in exchange for the convenience of voters to favor an insecure internet voting 
system. There are reasons why policymakers are conservative in implementing such a voting 
system.  
       Among those, one of the intuitions is that the whole voting process is invisible to most 
people. Firstly, it is invisible because it is hard for the public to understand the techniques behind 
it. While conventional voting systems at present also depend on computers by converting the 
decisions on the candidate to the databases of computers, the decision of voters using an 
application will be directly entered into the voting database. Besides, the internet voting system 
will also include more codes from different election stages. The process of how those data are 
recorded and manipulated into the database is intricate for the public and is less comprehensible 
compared to the way we record the data in conventional voting. To establish the trust of 
constituents, organizers want to ensure the voter can witness their vote. In other words, voters are 
always concerned that their vote "counts." In a conventional voting system, for example, the  
DRE with an audit trail voting system, which is implemented in the majority states of the U.S 
nowadays, Organizers are addressing this concern by providing a print-out version of the choice 
of voters before they are casting a vote. There is no internet voting system, however, which 
provides such records to the voter while they are casting their vote online. 
Another issue concerned is about the voting environment. In conventional voting, staff members 
are monitoring when the election is ongoing. Any attempt to tamper with the voting device will 
be detected, and alternative solutions will be implemented. However, the voting environments 
when implementing internet voting are complicated and might be beyond the control of the 
organizer. Specific to the internet voting system, the environment can be referred to as two 
perspectives: physical voting environment and device voting environment. For a physical voting 
environment, it cannot be assured that the vote is out of the will, if not witnessed by the 
organizer, like in the polling station. Voters may be under the influence of alcohol or coerced by 
someone to make an involuntary decision. Organizers cannot ensure the safety of the voting 
environment. Moreover, it seems that organizers cannot control the device environment of the 
voters, either. Devices, such as desktop computers or smartphones, may malfunction while 
voting or being hacked by a virus that can control the voting. The virus could potentially hack 
into the computer of voters and make choices or changes against the will of the owners. All in 
all, those who favor conventional voting do not want a system with many potential risks and 
situations that organizers cannot control. 
 There is another interesting consequence of lacking control of the voting environment. Selling 
votes and verification of selling votes would become efficient in the internet voting system. 
Although it is a common problem in all voting systems because the voting process in 
conventional voting is under the surveillance of the organizer, it is hard to verify a vote-selling. 
While in the internet voting system, one could provide their username and password to the buyer 
under some internet voting system that does not require face recognition. Another way that vote 
sellers can prove their choice is to record the entire voting process and provide it to the buyer. It 
seems that the internet voting system is ideal for vote buying/selling, as well as for vote 
swapping.  
           From the perspective of the internet voting system itself, we cannot see, those opponents 
argue, whether the internet-based voting is secure, even if the makers claim it is invulnerable. 
The most severe attack would come from the insider, who can access critical databases for an 
election. Insiders can easily modify the result by changing the data in the database, which would 
be undetectable if done by a skilled hacker. Furthermore, even if it is free from data 
modification, it can suffer from other kinds of service disruptions. For example, a denial of 
service attack (DDoS attack) is a low-cost method that can prevent legitimate voters from casting 
a vote on the website. 
    Other claims from opponents include that we cannot even detect whether the data in the 
system is modified or not since there are no robust verification mechanisms behind the internet 
voting system. While the malfunction of voting machines could be detected and the machine 
could be stopped to use for maintenance during the election, it is crucial for the internet voting 
system to run during the election. That means the server, database, internet, and other 
components of the internet voting system Should be in good standing in the entire voting 
process. Unlike voting machines distributed in various polling stations, It seems that the internet 
voting system will only be functioning as a whole.  
   It seems that while we reduced the amount of time wasted going to the polling station, we are 
risking ourselves into several potential problems in the internet-based voting system. Not only 
organizers cannot control both the physical and computer environment of the voters, but also the 
voting system itself is vulnerable to be hacked or modified, both from insider and outsider, 
which the latter can be anyone or any organization in the world. It is afraid that the server will be 
like any other server in the world, malfunctioned in the critical moment. It seems that part of the 















Chapter 3 Introduction of a possible blockchain voting 
system based on Ethereum  
            As introduced earlier, blockchain is, by its name, a series of growing blocks chained 
together. In a typical blockchain, every block contains the hash function that is dependent on the 
previous block (except the first block), a timestamp, and transaction data. It requires consensus 
in the network to change any of the data, which is nearly impossible. As Rifa and Budi point out 
in their paper Blockchain-Based E-Voting Recording System Design, "The block is related 
because from the previous hash used in the next block making process, the attempt to change the 
information will be more difficult as it has to change the next blocks"(2017). The blockchain-
based voting system can appear to be as simple as a normal online voting platform to the voter, 
however, implemented blockchain technology in the back end. A voting system has many 
components, including voter registration, election form configuration; in this paper, we will only 
discuss the design of the vote phrase and tally phrase. Implementing the blockchain concept in 
the voting system seems promising; however, we must design the safest voting system that is 
immune to any chance of changing any voting data. 
   There are many variants of blockchain techniques and concepts that we could incorporate into 
the voting system. It is also possible to build an independent platform for a voting system, 
although the cost of it would be higher than utilizing an existing blockchain-based platform. In 
this paper, we will implement an existing blockchain platform as the level of 87 security would 
be as same as the platform that we built from scratch. While Bitcoin is undoubtedly dominant in 
the area of cryptocurrency, it is not fit for other applications to run on the bitcoin ledger. 
   Here we want to introduce Ethereum as a backend in the voting system. As the figure 
shows(figure 1), the blockchain-based voting system could appear as the same as the current 
internet voting website showing for voters but implement, rather than traditional database, 
Ethereum based blockchain platform.    
 Ethereum was founded by Vitalik Buterin in 2013 and was described by the founder as a "Next-
Generation Smart Contract and Decentralized Application Platform."(Vitalik,2013) In other 
words, Its aim includes providing a protocol for building decentralized applications(DApps). 
There are three types of applications that are suitable to run on the Ethereum platform largely 
because of the advantage of smart contracts that are embodied. The first kind is financial 
derivatives like futures and options, which can be automatically transferred or executed. The 
second kind of Dapps that can run on the Ethereum platform is semi-financial, where the money 
is involved, but there are other non-monetary situations in the application. Our design of the 
voting system is attributed to the third kind, which does not involve money but only a series of 
events. 
The smart contract is the most prominent feature on Ethereum. It is written in the Solidity 
language that was introduced by Vitalik with a combination of C++ and javascript. The smart 
contract is provided in the Ethereum network that enables it to execute without a traditional 
server but runs through Ethereum virtual machine. Like the process of Java Code, a smart 
contract written in Solidity language will run through an Etherrum virtual machine and be 
translated to Application binary interface (ABI) and Smart Contract Bytecode. The former is 
used to interact with solidity and bytecode, and the bytecode is packed with other parameters into 
a transaction. The transaction will be signed and be put on an Ethereum block once deployed. 
Below is the flowchart of how smart contract deployed on the Ethereum blockchain. 
 
 
We want to discuss how and at what stage that smart contract could play a role in a voting 
system. We will take the US presidential general election in this paper as a typical example of a 
voting system. Although under the US constitution, presidential election voting is organized at 
the state level. It is up to each state to decide whether to implement Ethereum at all or use the 
platform partially in some stages of the voting process. We will design for each stage of the 
voting process independently and have an interface between them so they can access the 
database from each other(some may be unidirectional). 
Design principle: 
Eligibility of the voter and the vote: only registered voters are eligible to cast a vote in a 
specific session of the election. When performing voting, only registered voters with additional 
verification right before the voting can cast a vote. Every vote is counted. There will be no 
invalid vote of any kind if a vote is tallied and cast by a registered and verified voter. 
No multiple voting is allowed: It seems to be an issue for online voting that some multiple 
voting from one voter is inevitable; in Blockchain-based voting system, especially the one that 
implemented Ethereum as the platform, it is easily prevented: Once an identified voter(with 
unique ID) cast vote, the status of the voter will change to "voted"(or other forms of "voted"), 
which under this status the voter cannot cast another vote, but can only verify the vote cast. 
The integrity of the vote: No one can modify the result of any vote. 
Source code must be published: Source code of the entire voting system should be reviewed 
before implemented.  
Privacy of voters: Although the voting system source code is public, all data involving voters 
and votes must be stored in a database that is not public. 
Proposed Voting schemes: 
First stage: voter registration. Before the general presidential election, all eligible voters need 
to register to get the ballot. Up to now, online voter registration is enabled in more than 40 states 
in the U.S. Having the existing database of resident transfer to the Ethereum platform seems 
reasonable and convenient for the election officials. Another way is to have an interface 
connected with the voting smart contract to determine the eligibility of the voter. Either way will 
enable the database free from unauthorized modification. Moreover, biometric information such 
as photos is needed for voter verification before casting a vote. 
Second stage: voter verification. Voters can either go online or use mobile applications to cast 
a vote. Before casting a vote, facial recognition may be used to verify the identity of the voter. 
Other verification could also be used if they can verify the unique identity of the voter. 
Third stage: vote stage: verified voter(encrypted with ring signature*, which keeps the voter 
anonymous when voting, also allows observers to tally the vote without knowing any identity of 
voters) cast a vote from a list of candidates once. 
* invented by Ron Rivest, Adi Shamir, and Yael Tauman, and introduced at ASIACRYPT in 
2001, a Ring signature is a type of asymmetric cryptography that keeps voters anonymous when 
observers tally the vote.  
Fourth stage: Vote validation: check again for voter verification and mark the status of voter 
change to “voted”. 
Fifth stage: Vote tally and count:  the vote is counted to the database. Observers other than 
administrator tally the vote.  
Voting system components: 
Corresponding to different voting stages, there are essential components for the designed 
voting system. For the user interface, web and mobile applications are needed for the voter to 
register and vote. They can be either integrated into one website or application or using several 
depending on the law of each state. For the backend, a database server and smart contract should 
be implemented. 
Implementation of smart contract and discussion 
Here we will only the core component of the voting system for the smart contract portion, and 
we will discuss its performance and cost. 
Implementation of smart contract and discussion 
Here we will only the core component of the voting system for the smart contract portion, and 







Roles and rights 
Although our application(or smart contract) is a decentralized one, we 
still need an administrator(in Ethereum platform called “the owner of the 
contracts”) who cannot manipulate any ongoing election, but can initiate 
one and set the condition for the end of the election. More importantly, this 
administrator can determine who is eligible to vote before the set event is 
started.(Right hand side is the pseudocode for the features that 
administrator have) 
Another role is voter, which has a state of “isVoted” and “isVerified”. 
Voters will be added to the database and will be assigned a unique address. 
Each election administrator will assign a unique address every time for a 
registered voter. Before every voting, the voter needs to be verified by 
biometric information in order to get the status of “isVerified” changed. Only 
a verified and voted vote will be valid. (Right hand side is the pseudocode for 
the features that voters have) 


























&& !Voter.isVoted && 
CandidateID&& 
now >=Startdate &&now 
<=endDate) 
{ Candidate.voteCount++; 
 Voter.isVoted = true; 
} 
 
 For voters to vote, they must be verified, and the time of voting is later than the set start date 
and before the end date. Then they will be marked “is voted” and their choice of candidate will 
have one more vote on their voteCount Variable. (Right hand side is the pseudocode for the vote 
function) 
Within the function of initiateNewElection, there is a list of candidateIDs, 
which contains vote count and a Boolean status of winning the election (either 
true or false). The winning condition is when the end date passes, the most 
voted candidate will be labeled by the Boolean variable “win” true, thus 
winning the election.(Right hand side is the pseudocode for the features of 
candidates and the winning condition) 
Discussion 
     We could see based on the Ethereum platform, our coding language solidity of smart 
contract is like JavaScript, with addressID feature. That is because the Ethereum structure has 
already done the immutability and the platform is favored by many developers. Notably, every 
transaction needs the miner in the network to confirm, and often multiple times. In our case, 
every transaction, and every recording, including register people eligible for vote, needs to be 
confirmed and time stamped by the miner in the network. It cost “gas” to confirm every 
transaction in the Ethereum network to keep the platform running. Gas is the unit of measure for 
the amount of work that is accomplished for an operation and the gas price is measured in terms 
of ether in Ethereum network (Buterin et al., 2013). A million of additions or subtraction, 
according to Buterin, cost three million gases (about 5 dollars for the current Ethereum 
cryptocurrency price). But if we want to store the data as large as the registered voter for the U.S. 
Struct Candidate{ 
Address ID; 
Int voteCount = 0; 
Bool Win = false; 
} 





andidateID.win = true; 
} 
presidential election, it could cost millions of dollars. But it is still substantially less than the 
election that we held today, which cost billions of dollars.  
Further Improvement for the core component 
First, those chunks are pseudocode, which is not an actual application of a voting system. If we 
make an actual application, we could find out the performance and the actual cost of a simulated 
election. Secondly, the model we proposed should add ring signatures to protect the voter 
privacy when voting, and that can be discussed in other scholar’s models. 
Potential challenges to the Ethereum platform 
As we determine to design a voting system based on the Ethereum network, we trust that the 
Ethereum network, under any circumstance, will maintain its immutability. Some situations may 
be theoretically possible; however, they are prevented in the real world. 
51% and 67% attack 
 Under the consensus of proof of work, if a group of miners in the network controls more than 
50% of the mining computing power. They could determine to either halt any transaction they 
wanted or do the transaction twice. In our voting system case, they could either halt any voting 
activities, or they can also vote twice. To prevent such issues, Ethereum changed their consensus 
to proof of stake in 2020. It will punish the actor with fraudulent transactions such as 
confiscating all the stake of the actor. 
 
Quantum computer  
Quantum computers are developing, and it has tremendous power over the traditional 
computer in some perspective. Some may say that once quantum computers emerged in the 
blockchain network, it may become a threat to the applications and transactions that run on the 
blockchain. However, unlike proof of work, where the computing power is the only factor that 
miner can initiate a 51% attack, proof of stake does not have such problem. Other than that, the 
advantages of quantum computer only limits to certain tasks like integer factorization and 
discrete logarithm problem, which does not relate to the computing power defined by either 
Bitcoin or Ethereum network. So, quantum computers would not pose a threat to the future of the 
Ethereum network.    
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